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Abstract 
Under highly security vulnerable, resource restricted, and 
dynamically changing mobile ad hoc environments, it is 
critical to be able to maximize the system lifetime while 
bounding the communication response time for 
mission-oriented mobile groups. In this paper, we analyze 
the tradeoff of security versus performance for distributed 
intrusion detection protocols employed in mobile group 
communication systems (GCSs). We investigate a 
distributed voting-based intrusion detection protocol for 
GCSs in multi-hop mobile ad hoc networks and examine the 
effect of intrusion detection on system survivability 
measured by the mean time to security failure (MTTSF) 
metric and efficiency measured by the communication cost 
metric. We identify optimal design settings under which the 
MTTSF metric can be best traded off for the communication 
cost metric or vice versa.  
 
1.  Introduction 
Developing network security protocols in mobile ad hoc 
networks (MANETs) has design challenges due to high 
security vulnerabilities and unique characteristics of 
MANET environments such as open medium, dynamic 
changing network topology, decentralized decision-making 
and cooperation, lack of centralized authority, lack of 
resources in mobile devices (e.g., bandwidth, memory, 
computational power), and no clear line of defense [7]. 
Under these environmental constraints, intrusion detection 
mechanisms are used as a second line of defense and have 
become essential for systems with the goal of 
high-survivability in the presence of inside attackers. 
  This paper concerns distributed intrusion detection 
employed in mission-oriented group communication 
systems (GCSs) in MANETs for detecting and evicting 
compromised nodes. Examples of mission-oriented GCSs 
include rescue teams with mobile devices in disaster 
management, soldiers with mobile devices in battlefield 
situations, mobile robots with embedded sensor systems to 
explore the surface of Mars [11], and mobile tanks with 
sensors to survey a hostile battlefield for tracking 
bio/chemical plumes [11]. In these mission-oriented mobile 
applications for MANETs, guaranteeing maximum system 
lifetime while minimizing bandwidth consumed is critical 
for successful mission execution.  
Many emerging mobile applications depend on the 
notion of secure group communication where mobile nodes 
can join or leave a group dynamically [9]. A compromised 
node in a group can compromise the security of the system 
when useful information has been leaked out to 
compromised nodes. Compromised nodes may also collude. 
To tolerate/detect intrusions, it is essential to dynamically 
detect and evict compromised nodes by adaptively 
enhancing the defense in response to the attacker strength. 
On the other hand, if IDS is performed unnecessarily 
frequent, it may adversely affect the performance of GCS. 
While intrusion detection systems (IDS) for wired 
networks have been extensively studied, there has been little 
work on IDS for wireless mobile environments, particularly 
for MANETs.  Zhang et al. [15] pioneered a distributed and 
cooperative intrusion detection model based on anomaly 
detection by which all nodes in the system run IDS to detect 
and respond to intrusion.  Nevertheless, no specific IDS or 
reactive IDS protocol was discussed. Cluster-based IDS for 
MANETs has been proposed [1, 12, 14].  The main idea is 
that a cluster head (CH) collects security-related 
information from nodes in the same cluster and determines 
if any intrusion has occurred.  An important issue not 
addressed is performance degradation due to zone-based 
IDS. Marti et al. [6] developed a watchdog mechanism for 
identifying misbehaving nodes based on dynamical 
behaviors and developed a pathrater algorithm for routing 
around misbehaving nodes for MANETs.  Hierarchical IDS 
was proposed to realize distributed anomaly-based IDS in 
MANETs [1, 4]. However, the issues of extra latency and 
energy consumption were not addressed.  [1, 4] only 
examined security properties of IDS in MANETs without 
dealing with reactive approaches against any changes of 
attackers’ behaviors.  Stern et al. [12] proposed data 
reduction techniques to reduce communication costs in their 
IDS design. However, detection latency introduced by data 
aggregation and their effect on performance degradation 
were not investigated.   
Our work differs from prior work in that we consider the 
impact of IDS on performance degradation, and identify 
optimal design settings of adaptive IDS based on the    
tradeoff between performance (i.e., communication cost) 
versus security (i.e., mean time to security failure or 
MTTSF) for GCSs in MANETs.  
Recently, Subhadrabandhu et al. [13] studied the 
tradeoff between energy/computational/communication 
resource consumption versus IDS accuracy based on 
distributed IDS. Algorithms were developed to explore the 
tradeoff.  Our work differs from their work in that we 
specifically deal with GCSs in MANETs as well as propose 
a framework to identify optimal design settings of adaptive 
distributed IDS under system-imposed security and 
performance requirements. To evaluate both security and 
performance characteristics of IDS in GCSs, the 
approach used in our work has its root in model-based 
quantitative analysis [8]. In the literature, we have seen 
some recent work extending model-based quantitative 
analysis to security analysis. Madan et al. [5] employed a 
Semi-Markov Process (SMP) model to evaluate security 
attributes of an intrusion tolerant system to obtain 
dependability measures such as availability, and a 
transient analysis with absorbing states to obtain security 
measures such as mean time to security failure (MTTSF).  
Most of the previous work cited above, however, often only 
focused on security measures without considering the 
impact of deploying security mechanisms on the 
performance of the system.  Further, they did not deal with 
system optimization issues in terms of identifying optimal 
design settings of adaptive IDS based on the tradeoff for 
mission-oriented mobile groups. 
The contributions of the paper are as follows. First, we 
develop quantitative analysis methods to analyze the 
tradeoff between security and performance of mobile GCSs 
in MANETs, in the presence of inside attackers and 
intrusion detection mechanisms, recognizing the fact that 
security mechanisms often have impacts on the performance 
property of the system. We develop an analytical model 
based on Stochastic Petri nets (SPN) to succinctly describe 
the inside attacker, the GCS, and distributed intrusion 
detection mechanisms with the goal to evaluate the effect of 
intrusion detection on security and performance properties 
of the system.  Second, when given a set of parameter values 
characterizing the operational or environmental conditions 
of the system, we identify the optimal intrusion detection 
interval under which the MTTSF metric is maximized. 
Moreover, we effectively trade security off for performance, 
or vice versa, such that system designers can adjust the 
intrusion detection interval to maximize MTTSF while 
satisfying imposed performance requirements in terms of 
overall communication cost. Third, we propose a robust, 
efficient, and adaptive distributed intrusion detection 
mechanism that dynamically adjusts the intrusion detection 
interval and a detection function optimally reacting to 
dynamically changing attacker strength. Our IDS protocol 
considers the effect of possible collusion of compromised 
nodes as well as IDS intrinsic defects including false 
positives and false negatives.  Lastly, we model our secure 
GCS for MANETs based on realistic behaviors of inside 
attackers.   
2.  Preliminary 
2.1 Secure Group Communication Systems in 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks  
Secure GCSs are most often seen in military settings 
where combat units spread out in a geographical area 
without a communication infrastructure but must maintain a 
consistent view in order to make correct combat decisions. 
Group members must communicate each other state 
changes, such as changes of membership of nodes, their 
locations, and approaching objects. Very typically, such a 
military deployment is mission-oriented and the goal is to 
complete the combat mission within its system lifetime. In 
this sense, the security requirement is expressed in terms of 
a threshold for MTTSF such that the system must be able to 
survive security threats past the minimum mission time.   
The timeliness requirement is the delay requirement per 
packet. This translates into a maximum network traffic rate 
which bounds the delay or response time per packet. 
An efficient way to achieve secure group 
communications is to use a symmetric key, called the group 
key, shared by group members. Group members may agree 
upon the group key by means of a group key agreement 
protocol in a MANET in which there is no centralized key 
server. Group members employ the group key to encrypt 
group messages. By employing the group key as a secret 
key, only members of the group are able to decrypt and read 
group messages [9]. This achieves the confidentiality 
property for secure group communications. 
In a dynamic group setting where users can join or leave 
the group at any time, the group key needs to be rekeyed. 
There are the two main security properties commonly 
associated with rekeying [9], namely, forward secrecy, 
which means that an adversary who knows previous group 
keys cannot identify subsequent group keys, and backward 
secrecy, which means that an adversary who knows the 
current group key cannot discover previous group keys.  To 
maintain both backward and forward secrecy, rekeying (i.e., 
change the group key) is performed whenever a group 
membership change event occurs due to a user newly 
joining the group or a current member leaving or being 
evicted.  
For MANETs, there is no centralized trusted key server. 
Instead a distributed key management protocol, a 
contributory key agreement (CKA) protocol, would be used 
for rekeying upon a join/leave/eviction event. Without loss 
of generality, this paper uses a CKA protocol with GDH 
[10] for secret key generation in a distributed way.  
 
2.2 Distributed Intrusion Detection Protocols 
We consider two types of intrusion detection protocols 
applicable to GCSs in MANETs, i.e., host-based IDS versus 
voting-based IDS.  The first type is host-based IDS [15] in 
which each node performs local detection to determine if a 
neighboring node has been compromised. Each node may 
preinstall host-based IDS with standard existing IDS 
techniques such as misuse detection (also called 
signature-based detection) and anomaly detection [15] so    
that our proposed voting-based IDS can be independent of 
the host-based IDS technique used as a general framework.  
Each node may evaluate its neighbors based on information 
collected, mostly route-related and traffic-related 
information [4].  We measure the effectiveness of IDS 
techniques applied (e.g., misuse detection or anomaly 
detection) for host-based IDS by two parameters, namely, 
the false negative probability (p1) and false positive 
probability (p2).  In general, when the system uses misuse 
detection for IDS, it tends to have more false negatives and 
less false positives (e.g., higher p1 and lower p2).  On the 
other hand, when the system employs anomaly detection for 
IDS, it is likely to have fewer false negatives and more false 
positives (e.g., lower p1 and higher p2).   
The second type is voting-based IDS for cooperative 
detection based on majority voting. Voting-based IDS 
derives from the fault tolerance concept based on majority 
voting for evicting a target node in the context of sensor 
networks [2]. For voting-based IDS to be performed, each 
node again is preinstalled with host-based IDS to collect 
information to detect the status of neighboring nodes. 
Periodically a target node would be evaluated by m 
vote-participants dynamically selected where m is a design 
parameter. If the majority of m nodes decided to vote against 
the target node, then the target node would be evicted from 
the system by means of rekeying. This adds intrusion 
tolerance to tolerate collusion of compromised nodes in 
MANETs as it takes the majority of “bad” nodes among m 
nodes to work against the system. We characterize 
voting-based IDS by two parameters, namely, false negative 
probability (Pfn) and false positive probability (Pfp). These 
two parameters can be calculated based on (a) the per-node 
false negative and positive probabilities (p1  and  p2) of 
host-based IDS in each node; (b) the number of 
vote-participants, m, selected to vote for or against a target 
node; and (c) an estimate of the current number of 
compromised nodes which may collude with the objective 
to disrupt the service of the system. Since m  nodes are 
selected to vote, if the majority of m voting-participants (i.e., 
    /2 ) cast negative votes against a target node, the 
target node is regarded as compromised and will be evicted 
from the system. 
 
3.  System Model 
This paper concerns a mission-oriented GCS consisting 
of mobile groups in MANETs equipped with intrusion 
detection to mainly deal with inside attackers.  We define a 
mobile group based on “connectivity.” When all nodes are 
connected, there is only a single group in the system. That is, 
group members must maintain connectivity for them to be in 
the same group. The GCS and its constituent mobile groups 
are “mission-oriented” in the sense that a mobile group may 
be partitioned into several groups due to network partition 
derived from node mobility or node failure, but each group 
will continue to execute the mission amid group partition 
and merge activities. Moreover, the GCS fails when any 
mobile group fails, modeling the case in which a security 
failure of any mobile group compromises the mission 
assigned, e.g., in secret mission situations. We assume that 
each member has a private key and its certified public key 
available for authentication purposes. When a new member 
joins a mobile group, the new member’s identity is 
authenticated based on the member public/private key pair 
by applying the challenge/response mechanism. We assume 
that the GCS maintains view synchrony (VS) [9] by which 
messages are guaranteed to be delivered reliably and in 
order. We characterize the workload and operational 
conditions of a GCS in MANETs by a set of model 
parameters. We assume that the inter-arrival times of join 
and leave requests are exponentially distributed with their 
rates being λ and μ respectively.  Also we assume that the 
inter-arrival time of data packets issued by a node for group 
communication is exponentially distributed with rate λq. 
The assumption of exponential distribution can be relaxed 
since the SPN performance model developed is capable of 
allowing any general distribution for a transition time. We 
assume that the time to perform a rekeying operation upon a 
membership change event (i.e., join or leave event) or a 
forced eviction is measured based on GDH [10] to realize 
distributed key management in MANETs.  
Recognizing the principles [3] that attacker behaviors are 
not always random, we use three attacker functions to model 
the attacker strength based on the prediction of time and 
effort made to perform an attack as follows:  
•  Logarithmic time attacker: The attacker increasingly 
takes longer time to compromise nodes in the system, 
following a logarithmic function curve.  
•  Linear time attacker: The attacker compromises nodes 
one after the other with the node compromising rate linear to 
the number of compromised nodes in the system. 
•  Polynomial time attacker: The attacker increasingly 
takes shorter time to compromise nodes in the system, 
following an exponential function curve.  
We assume that IDS will perform its function 
periodically. The detection interval is dynamically adjusted 
in response to the accumulated number of intrusions that 
have been detected in the system. Similar to the attacker 
behavior model above, we consider three detection 
functions to model the IDS activities in terms of periodicity, 
namely,  logarithmic, linear,  and polynomial periodic 
detection, as follows: 
•  Logarithmic periodic detection: In this detection 
scheme, the system performs intrusion detection in a 
conservative way with a rate logarithmic to the number of 
compromised nodes that have been identified.  
•  Linear periodic detection: This system performs IDS 
with a linear rate to the number of intrusions that have been 
detected in the system.   
•  Polynomial periodic detection: This detection scheme 
aggressively performs IDS by increasing the detection rate 
in a polynomial fashion to the number of observed 
compromised nodes in the system.  
To alleviate collusion among compromised nodes, the 
system performs voting-based IDS by which the majority of 
vote-participants must agree to evict a target node before the 
target node is evicted. The number of vote-participants (m)    
is a system parameter whose effect will be analyzed in the 
paper.  
We define two security group failure conditions so that a 
mobile group enters a security failure state when one of the 
two security group failure conditions stated below is true. 
That is, the GCS fails if any of mobile groups fails when 
either Condition C1 or C2 listed below is true.  
•  Condition C1: a compromised but undetected member 
requests and subsequently obtains data using the group key.  
The system is in a failure state because data have been 
leaked out to a compromised node, leading the loss of 
system integrity in a security sense. 
•  Condition C2: more than 1/3 of member nodes are 
compromised but undetected by IDS.  We assume the 
Byzantine Failure model [3] such that when more than 1/3 
of member nodes in a mobile group are compromised, the 
mobile group is compromised, resulting in the loss of 
availability of system services. 
If a member node is detected as compromised by IDS, 
the system won’t allow the member node to request data 
anymore and will evict the member immediately to satisfy 
the forward/backward secrecy requirement. After a node is 
detected as compromised and evicted from the system, it 
cannot rejoin the group again.  That is, there is no recovery 
mechanism available in the system to repair a compromised 
member and make it a trusted member node again.  Initially, 
all nodes are trusted.   
We assume that there are intrusion prevention techniques 
in place, such as encryption or authentication, to deal with 
outsider attacks (e.g., disrupting traffic, modifying data, 
eavesdropping).  Insider attacks are due to compromised 
nodes disguised as legitimate members to disrupt the 
system.  We also consider the behaviors of inside attackers 
such as obtaining secret information and accordingly 
passing it to outside attackers (i.e., illegal data leak out) or 
disseminating a fake vote to keep more compromised nodes 
but evict good nodes from the system.  
 
3.1 Security and Performance Metrics  
• MTTSF (Mean Time to Security Failure): This metric 
indicates the average time elapsed for the GCS to reach a 
security failure state. The GCS fails when any mobile group 
reaches a security failure state when (1) data have been 
leaked out to a compromised but undetected member node 
(i.e., C1), or (2) more than 1/3 of the member nodes have 
been compromised (i.e., C2).  Note that illegal data leak out 
only occurs when a compromised but undetected member 
requests data and subsequently obtains data using the group 
key.  As a security metric, lower MTTSF means faster loss 
of system integrity or loss of availability.  A design goal is to 
maximize MTTSF. 
• Communication Traffic Cost (Ĉtotal):  This metric 
indicates the total traffic incurred per time unit (s) including 
group communication, status exchange, rekeying, intrusion 
detection, beacon, group partition/merge and 
mobility-induced activities. Since all nodes share the 
wireless bandwidth (BW), a high Ĉtotal will be translated into 
a high level of contention and consequently a high delay or 
response time for group communication. A design goal is to 
minimize Ĉtotal.  
 
4.  Performance Model 
 
Figure 1: SPN Model. 
We develop a SPN model as shown in Figure 1 to 
describe the behavior of a mobile group in the presence of 
insider attacks and intrusion detection activities, with the 
goal of identifying optimal design settings (i.e., optimal 
intrusion detection interval and detection function) to 
maximize MTTSF while satisfying imposed performance 
(i.e., overall communication cost) requirements. Here we 
describe how the SPN model is constructed as follows: 
•  The SPN model describes the behavior of a single 
mobile group as it evolves. This mobile group may partition 
into two and may merge with another group during its 
lifetime. We track trusted members, compromised members 
undetected, and compromised members detected during the 
group’s lifetime to understand its security and performance 
characteristics. Certainly the system knows the number of 
compromised nodes detected by IDS at all times. However, 
the system does not know compromised nodes not yet 
detected. It only knows the total number of member nodes. 
The SPN model predicts the number of compromised but 
yet detected nodes through knowledge of the node 
compromising rate or the attacker function explained below. 
•  We use places to classify nodes except for place NG 
which holds the current number of groups in the system. 
Specifically, place Tm holds trusted members, UCm holds 
compromised nodes not yet detected by IDS, and DCm holds 
compromised nodes that have been detected by IDS. Note 
that Tm, UCm, and DCm represent nodes in one group, not in 
the system.  To be more specific, the numbers of nodes in 
places  Tm,  UCm,  and DCm, obtained by mark(Tm), 
mark(UCm),  and mark(DCm), respectively, would be 
adjusted based on the number of groups existing in the 
system (obtained by mark(NG)), which changes upon group 
merge/partition events. 
•  We use transitions to model events. Specifically, 
T_MER and T_PAR model the group merge or partition 
events, respectively; T_CP models a node being 
compromised. T_FA models a node being falsely identified 
as compromised. T_IDS models a compromised node being 
UCm   DCm
 T_CP 
T_IDS 
  GF 
  T_DRQ 
 T_FA 
Tm
  T_MER 
NG
T_PAR 
     T_RK    
detected.  T_RK  models rekeying. T_DRQ models a data 
leak security failure (i.e., C1). A firing of a transition will 
change the state of the system, which is represented by the 
distribution of tokens in the SPN. For example, mark(NG) 
changes upon firing T_MER or T_PAR since the number of 
groups changes upon a group merge or partition event; the 
number of compromised nodes undetected increments by 1 
and, place UCm will hold one more token when T_CP fires. 
A transition is eligible to fire when the firing conditions 
associated with the event are met. The firing conditions are 
(1) its input place must contain at least one token and (2) the 
associated enabling guard function, if exists, must return 
true. For example, T_CP is enabled to fire when there exists 
“good” nodes in the group, that is, place Tm holds at least 
one token, and the enabling function associated with T_CP 
returns true.  
•  Except for tokens contained in place NG, we use a 
“token” in the SPN model to represent a node in the group. 
The population of each type of nodes is equal to the number 
of tokens in the corresponding place. Initially, all N 
members are trusted in one group and put in place Tm as 
tokens.  
•  Trusted members may become compromised because 
of insider attacks with a node-compromising rate A(mc). 
This is modeled by firing transition T_CP and moving 
tokens one at a time (if it exists) from place Tm to place UCm.  
•  Tokens in place UCm represent compromised but 
undetected member nodes.  We consider the system as 
having experienced a security failure when data are leaked 
out to compromised but undetected members, i.e., C1.  A 
compromised and undetected member will attempt to 
compromise data from other members in the group. Because 
of the use of host-based IDS, a node will reply to such a 
request only if it could not identify the requesting node as 
compromised with the false negative probability p1. This is 
modeled by associating transition T_DRQ  with rate 
p1*λq*mark (UCm). The firing of transition T_DRQ  will 
move a token into place GF, at which point we regard the 
system as experiencing a security failure due to C1. 
•  A compromised node in place UCm may be detected by 
IDS before it compromises data in the GCS.  The intrusion 
detection activity of the mobile group is modeled by the IDS 
detection rate D(md). Whether the damage has been done by 
a compromised node before the compromised node is 
detected depends on the relative magnitude of the 
node-compromising rate (A(mc)) versus the IDS detection 
rate (D(md)). When transition T_IDS fires, a token in place 
UCm will be moved to place DCm, meaning that a 
compromised but undetected node now becomes detected 
by IDS.  For voting-based IDS, the transition rate of T_IDS 
is mark(UCm)*D(md)* (1-Pfn), taking into consideration of 
the number of compromised but yet detected nodes and the 
false negative probability of voting-based IDS. 
Voting-based IDS can also false-positively identify a trusted 
member node as compromised.  This is modeled by moving 
a trusted member in place Tm to place DCm after transition 
T_FA fires with rate mark(Tm)*D(md)* Pfp. Note that 
voting-based IDS parameters, Pfn and Pfp, can be derived 
based on p1 and p2, the number of vote-participants (m), 
and the current number of compromised nodes which may 
collude to disrupt the service of the system. Later we will 
show how we may parameterize Pfn and Pfp. 
•  A mobile group experiences a security failure if either 
security failure condition, C1 or C2, is met.  We model this 
by making the group enter an absorbing state when either 
C1 or C2 is true.  To achieve this, we associate every 
transition in the SPN model with an enabling function that 
returns  false (disabling the transition from firing) when 
either C1 or C2 is met, and returns true otherwise.  For the 
SPN model, C1 is true when mark(GF) > 0 representing that 
data have been leaked out to compromised, undetected 
members; C2 is true when more than 1/3 of member nodes 
are compromised but undetected as indicated  by 
mark(UCm)/(mark(Tm) + mark(UCm)) > 1/3. 
 
4.1 Parameterization 
Here we describe the parameterization process, i.e., how 
to give model parameters proper values reflecting the 
operational and environmental conditions of the system.   
•  Tcm: Recall that Tcm is the communication time required 
for broadcasting a rekey message for a join or leave event 
based in GDH.  The reciprocal of Tcm is the rate of transition 
T_RK.   
• A (mc): This is an attacker function that returns the rate at 
which nodes are compromised in the mobile group. It will 
apply to transition T_CP in the SPN model. Three different 
attacker strengths are considered based on the time taken to 
compromise a node, namely, logarithmic,  linear, and 
polynomial time given by Alog (mc) = λclogp(mc), Alinear (mc) 
= λcmc, and A poly (mc) = λc(mc)
p respectively, where mc = 
(mark(Tm) + mark(UCm)) / mark(Tm). These three attacker 
strengths differ by the way the node compromising rate 
increases as more nodes become compromised. For the 
linear attacker function, the node compromised rate 
increases linearly with the number of compromised nodes. 
Hence, Alinear (mc) = λc mc where mc reflects the degree of 
compromised nodes currently in the group and λc is the base 
node compromising rate initially given that there is no 
compromised node in the group. For Alog (mc), the 
compromising rate increases in a logarithm form with the 
number of compromised nodes. For Apoly (mc) the 
compromising rate increases in an exponential form with 
the number of compromised nodes. Note that these three 
forms are prediction functions for the node compromising 
rate. The base compromising rate (λc) can be obtained by 
first-order approximation from observing the number of 
compromised nodes over a time period. We also note that p 
is a base index parameter selected to reflect the degree of 
changes of the logarithmic and polynomial attacker 
functions with respect to the number of compromised nodes. 
It requires fine tuning after sufficient data are collected. We 
choose p=3 in this paper. 
• D (md): This is a detection function that returns the rate at 
which IDS is invoked. Three different detection functions, 
namely,  logarithmic,  linear, and polynomial periodic 
detection, are given by Dlog (md) = logp(md)/ /TIDS, Dlinear (md) 
=md/TIDS, and Dpoly (md) = (md)
p/TIDS, respectively, where md    
=  Ninit/(mark(Tm) + mark(UCm)). These three functions 
differ by the way the detection rate changes with the number 
of compromised nodes that have been detected by IDS. For 
the linear detection function, the IDS detection rate 
increases linearly with the number of compromised nodes 
detected. Dlinear (mc) is the linear periodic detection function 
where mc indicates the degree of compromised nodes that 
have been detected by IDS, and TIDS is the base detection 
time interval which we aim to determine for maximizing 
MTTSF when applying voting-based IDS. The log detection 
function, Dlog (md), and exponential detection function, Dpoly 
(md), have the same form as their counterparts in the attacker 
function. We note again that p is a base index parameter 
selected to reflect the degree of changes of the logarithmic 
and polynomial detection functions with respect to the 
number of compromised nodes detected. We again choose 
p=3 in this paper. 
• Group Merge and Partition: We model group merge 
and partition events by a birth-death process with birth 
modeling group partitioning and death modeling group 
merging. We obtain group merging/partitioning rates by 
simulation for a sufficiently long period of time.  
• Pfn, Pfp: Pfn is the probability of false negatives defined as 
the number of compromised nodes diagnosed by 
voting-based IDS as trusted healthy nodes (i.e., detecting a 
bad node as a good node) over the number of detected 
nodes.  On the other hand, Pfp is the probability of false 
positives defined as the number of normal nodes flagged as 
anomaly over the number of trusted normal nodes.  We 
consider the intrinsic defect of host-based IDS in each node 
as well as the possible collusion of compromised nodes 
during the voting process. If a vote-participant is 
compromised, it can cast a negative vote to evict a healthy 
target node in the group or it can cast a positive vote for a 
malicious node to keep more compromised nodes in the 
group.  Equation 1 reflects these two cases of false positives 
or false negatives introduced into the group respectively, 
where Nmajority =   /2  and N = mark(Tm) + mark(UCm). 
Here m is the number of vote-participants to cast a vote 
against a target node, pf is p1 for calculating Pfn or p2 for 
calculating Pfp, Nbad is the number of currently compromised 
nodes in the group represented as mark (UCm), and Ngood is 
the number of currently healthy nodes in the group indicated 
as mark (Tm).  Pfp is obtained when the majority of voters 
consists of bad nodes who cast a negative vote against a 
good node, and good nodes who mistakenly diagnose a 
good node as a bad node with the probability of p2 (i.e., p2 
is a per-node false positive probability), resulting in a 
healthy node being evicted.  On the other hand, Pfn occurs 
when the majority of voters is from positive votes by bad 
nodes (i.e., casting a positive vote against a bad node) or 
good nodes who mistakenly diagnose a bad node as a good 
node with the probability of p1 (i.e., p1 is a per-node false 
negative probability), keeping more compromised nodes 
undetected in the group.  Note that Pfn and Pfp are constantly 
being adjusted to properly react to dynamically changing 
network and operational conditions, such as the degree of 
compromised nodes, node density, and number of 
vote-participants (m) used over time. 
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4.2 MTTSF and Ĉtotal Calculation 
MTTSF is obtained using the concept of mean time to 
absorption (MTTA) in the SPN model.  Specifically, we use 
a reward assignment such that a reward of 1 is assigned to 
all states except for absorbing states in which Condition C1 
o r  C 2  i s  m e t .  T h e  M T T S F  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  i s  s i m p l y  t h e  
expected accumulated reward until absorption, defined as 
    ∞     ∑             
∞
 
∞
     where S denotes the set of all 
states except absorbing states, ri (reward) is 1, and Pi(t) is 
the probability of state i at time t. 
  We calculate Ĉtotal by the probability-weighted average 
of Ĉtotal,i  representing the communication cost incurred per 
time unit (s) in state i.  Specifically, Ĉtotal is calculated by 
accumulating Ĉtotal,i (t) over MTTSF divided by MTTSF, 
i.e.,                      ,      
     
        ⁄ , where         ,   
     ,            ,           ,         ,            ,        ,   and 
ĈGC,i, Ĉstatus,i, Ĉrekey,i, ĈIDS,i, Ĉbeacon,i, and Ĉmp,i are costs per 
time unit for group communication, status exchange, 
rekeying, intrusion detection, beacon, group partition and 
group merge, and mobility events, respectively, given that 
the number of groups in the system is i. Due to space 
limitation, we omit calculation steps here. 
 
5.  Numerical Data and Analysis 
We present numerical data obtained through the 
evaluation of the SPN model developed and provide 
physical interpretations.  Our objective is to identify optimal 
intrusion detection interval (TIDS) that will maximize 
MTTSF while satisfying performance requirements of the 
system. We also aim to identify the best detection function 
to use in response to the attacker function (compromising 
rate) detected at runtime.  We vary the values of key 
parameters including the number of vote-participants in 
voting-based IDS (m=5 as the default), group 
communication rate (λq=1 per minute), base compromising 
rate (λc=1 per 12 hrs), and the attacker and detection 
functions to analyze their effects on the optimal base 
detection interval for maximizing MTTSF. The default 
values used for other parameters include the operational 
area of the MANET environment (radius=500 m), the 
number of nodes (N=100), per-node join rate (λ=1 per hr),    
per-node leave rate (μ=1 per 4 hrs), the wireless bandwidth 
(BW=1Mbps), and host-based IDS false positive or false 
negative probabilities (p1 = p2 = 1% since in general 1% or 
less is considered acceptable). Here we note that p1 and p2 
are two probability parameters for characterizing any 
host-based IDS preinstalled in each node. Each node moves 
according to the random waypoint mobility model. 
 
 
Figure 2: Effect of m on MTTSF and Optimal TIDS. 
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We first analyze the effect of intrusion detection interval 
(TIDS) on MTTSF as a function of the number of 
vote-participants (m) and demonstrate that there exists an 
optimal intrusion detection interval (TIDS) for maximizing 
MTTSF or minimizing Ĉtotal. Figure 2 shows the effect of 
intrusion detection interval (TIDS) on MTTSF as the number 
of vote-participants (m) changes for the case in which the 
attacker function and the detection function are both linear. 
We observe that there exists an optimal TIDS that maximizes 
MTTSF for each given m value.  In general, as TIDS becomes 
larger, MTTSF increases until its optimal point reaches, and 
then MTTSF decreases after the optimal point.  The reason 
of increasing MTTSF as TIDS increases initially is that as TIDS 
increases there are fewer nodes being falsely identified by 
IDS since IDS is triggered less often, thus reducing the 
system failure probability due to C2.  After the optimal TIDS 
is reached, MTTSF decreases again because IDS is not 
triggered often enough to detect compromised nodes which 
may perform attacks to cause system failures due to C1. 
Note that Pfp is one aspect of false alarms generated by IDS, 
and therefore more nodes will be falsely identified as 
compromised nodes if IDS is more frequently triggered. 
From Figure 2 we also observe the sensitivity of optimal 
TIDS identified on MTTSF as m varies. When m is large, the 
false alarm probability (Pfp + Pfn) is small because more 
nodes are participating in the voting process, reducing the 
possibility of collusion by compromised nodes.   
Consequently, when m is large, we observe a high MTTSF 
due to the small false alarm probability.  Conversely, when 
m is small, MTTSF is small due to a larger false alarm 
probability.  A smaller m also results in a longer optimal TIDS 
being used to maximize MTTSF to offset the adverse effect 
of IDS with large false positives, e.g., optimal TIDS = 480, 
60, 15, and 5 s for m = 3, 5, 7, and 9 respectively.  
Figure 3 shows the overall communication cost (Ĉtotal) 
versus the intrusion detection interval (TIDS) as the number 
of vote-participants (m) varies.  An optimal TIDS exists in 
each curve (for minimizing Ĉtotal) because of the tradeoff 
between decreasing normal group communication costs 
(ĈGC,i) and increasing IDS related communication costs 
(Ĉeviction,i + ĈIDS,i) as TIDS becomes shorter.  Also we observe 
that when m is large, Ĉtotal is high.  This is because a larger m 
induces a lower Pfp under which more nodes will be able to 
perform normal group activities. Furthermore, when there 
are more vote participants, there is a higher cost associated 
with dynamic majority voting.  Contrary to MTTSF versus 
TIDS, we do not observe the sensitivity of an optimal TIDS 
identified, but there is a relatively higher communication 
cost saved when the optimal TIDS identified is employed as m 
increases.  
Next we analyze how one can select the best detection 
interval (TIDS) and detection function D (md) to optimize 
MTTSF while satisfying the performance requirement in 
terms of communication overhead, when given the attacker 
function A (mc) detected at runtime. In Figure 4, we show 
MTTSF versus TIDS for the three detection functions D(md) 
given that the attacker function is linear. We see that each 
curve again has its own optimal TIDS. The linear detection 
function Dlinear(md) shows the best performance at TIDS = 120 
s generating the highest MTTSF overall, while the 
logarithmic detection function Dlog(md) is the worst, 
particularly when TIDS is sufficiently small. This tradeoff is 
attributed to the speed of detection (log, linear, or 
exponential) versus the speed of attack (linear).  If the 
former is greater than the latter, many false positives may be 
generated; conversely, many compromised nodes may 
remain in the system. The linear detection function that 
matches up with the linear attacker function is the best 
among the three detection functions in terms of the tradeoff 
of the two ends. With similar reasoning, we see that the 
strongest polynomial detection function Dpoly(md) performs 
well when TIDS is large (e.g., TIDS > 240 s) while the weakest 
logarithmic detection function Dlog(md) performs well when 
TIDS is small (TIDS < 15 s). 
Correspondingly Figure 5 shows the overall 
communication cost (Ĉtotal) versus TIDS for the three 
detection functions D(md) given that the attacker function is 
linear. Each curve in Figure 5 also has an optimal TIDS that 
minimizes  Ĉtotal. The general trend of the optimal TIDS 
identified is similar to that shown in Figure 4 except that the 
exact optimal TIDS points are different. The best 
performance of Ĉtotal is observed with linear detection at TIDS 
= 240 s while the worst performance of Ĉtotal is shown with 
logarithmic detection under the ranges of TIDS > 120 s and 
with polynomial detection under the ranges of TIDS ≤ 120 s. 
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In terms of the optimal TIDS identified to minimize Ĉtotal, we 
see that a shorter optimal TIDS is preferred with less 
aggressive logarithmic detection, since a shorter TIDS 
contributes to nodes being evicted more often, consequently 
leading to less group communication activities. On the other 
hand, as the detection function becomes aggressive, i.e., 
polynomial detection, a longer optimal TIDS is favorable to 
minimize Ĉtotal in order not to increase too much IDS related 
traffic more than needed due to aggressive IDS.  
These results demonstrate that the system could adjust 
the IDS detection strength in response to the attacker 
strength detected at runtime in order to maximize MTTSF 
and minimize Ĉtotal dynamically. By selecting the best 
detection function (logarithmic, linear, or polynomial) in 
response to the attacker strength, we can maximize MTTSF 
without experiencing much of the adverse effect of IDS. 
The results obtained in terms of MTTSF and Ĉtotal versus 
TIDS allow the system designer to select the best intrusion 
detection interval (TIDS) to maximize MTTSF while 
satisfying the Ĉtotal performance requirement.  
 
Figure 4: Effect of TIDS on MTTSF with respect to 
D(md) under linear time attackers when m = 5. 
 
     
Figure 5: Effect of TIDS on         with respect to 
D(md) under linear time attackers when m = 5. 
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